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Although it may appear antiquated in the “post-deregulation” era, the 
concept of antitrust immunity for industrial sectors remains a hallmark of U.S. 
international aviation law and policy.1  Following the protracted shutdown of 
the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in the 1980s,2 the Department of 
                                                 
 +Adjunct Professor of Law & One-time Senior Research Fellow, International Aviation Law 
Institute, DePaul University College of Law.  The Author wishes to thank Jonah and Manuel 
Sanchez for their impeccable frequent visits to his office during the formation of this article. 
 1. See PAUL L. JOSKOW, DEREGULATION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 19–21, 45–46 
(2009) (defending industrial deregulation in the face of the 2008 financial crisis).  See generally 
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries 
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1998) (detailing the United States’ recent regulatory 
transformation away from creating agencies to regulate individual industries and discussing the 
Civil Aeronautics Board’s shutdown). 
 2. See Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703 
(codified in scattered sections of Titles 5, 15, 16, 26, 29, and 49 U.S.C.); see also Paul Stephen 
Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil Aeronautics Board—Opening Wide the Floodgates of 
Entry, 11 TRANSP. L.J. 91, 93–95 (1979) (surveying the deregulation of the airline industry and 
the CAB’s eventual demise). 
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Transportation (DOT) assumed the CAB’s authority to approve and immunize 
cooperative agreements between U.S. and foreign airlines.3  Beginning in 
1992, airlines sought immunity in order to form the first airline  
alliances—joint ventures that allow participants to behave like a single, merged 
entity and cooperate on business practices such as pricing, routes, branding, 
and consumer perquisite programs.4  Since then, many of the world’s leading 
airlines have coalesced into three global alliances: oneworld, SkyTeam, and 
Star.  Each alliance has air transportation networks spanning the globe.5  Under 
normal circumstances, these types of activities would be subject to public and 
private antitrust actions, likely on the theory that they constitute a restraint of 
trade or an attempt to monopolize international air routes.6 
Unlike most global industries, airlines remain subject to treaty-based 
restrictions that limit their ability to access global capital markets and 
consummate cross-border mergers.7  Although the particulars vary, these 
treaty-based restrictions are commonly reinforced by domestic legal codes that 
make the issuance of operating authority contingent on the “purity” of an 
airline’s ownership profile.8  The United States, for example, mandates that 
foreign nationals may hold no more than twenty-five percent of an airline’s 
voting stock and requires the airline to remain under the “actual control” of 
American citizens.9  As such, airlines are effectively barred from acquiring or 
establishing foreign subsidiaries that would allow them to create autonomous 
global-route networks while availing themselves to the efficiencies of 
consolidation.10  To deliver the transnational services that modern consumers 
demand, airlines have relied on alliances as a “second-best” alternative within 
                                                 
 3. 49 U.S.C. §§ 41308–41309 (2006). 
 4. See, e.g., Order to Show Cause, The Acquisition of Northwest Airlines by Wings 
Holdings, Inc., Docket No. 46371 (Dep’t of Transp. Nov. 16, 1992), 1992 DOT Av. LEXIS 827 
[hereinafter Northwest/KLM Order to Show Cause]; see also W. Robert Hand, Comment, 
Continental Joins the (all)star Alliance: Antitrust Concerns with Airline Alliances and  
Open-Skies Treaties, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 641, 649 (2011) (discussing the Northwest/KLM 
alliance as the first of its kind). 
 5. See, e.g., Brian F. Havel & Gabriel S. Sanchez, Restoring Global Aviation’s 
“Cosmopolitan Mentalité”, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 37 (2011) (discussing the three main global 
alliances). 
 6. See EUR. COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE ALLIANCES: 
COMPETITIVE ISSUES AND REGULATORY APPROACHES 5–7 (2010); see also Scott Kimpel, 
Antitrust Considerations in International Airline Alliances, 63 J. AIR L. & COM. 475, 479–83 
(1997) (describing how DOJ authority, under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, relates to airline 
alliances). 
 7. See Brian F. Havel & Gabriel S. Sanchez, The Emerging Lex Aviatica, 42 GEO. J. INT’L 
L. 639, 642–53 (2011) (surveying international aviation’s trade environment, including its 
attendant ownership and investment restrictions); see also infra notes 75, 86, 225 and 
accompanying text. 
 8. See Havel & Sanchez, supra note 7, at 640–41, 647–48. 
 9. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 40102(a)(15), 41101(a)(1), 41102(a) (2006). 
 10. See Hand, supra note 4, at 643–44. 
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a suboptimal regulatory order.11  The DOT, in turn, has leveraged the 
commercial appeal of the alliance system into expanded foreign market 
opportunities for U.S. airlines by requiring the home countries of  
immunity-seeking carriers to first enter liberal aviation trade accords known as 
“Open Skies” agreements.12  Though “Open Skies-for-Immunity” has never 
been an officially pronounced component of U.S. international aviation 
policy,13 neither the DOT nor the Department of State (DOS)14 has made 
significant attempts to hide their importance in facilitating U.S. aeropolitical 
relations.15 
The reaction to immunized alliances has been mixed.16  A recent joint report 
on transatlantic alliances sponsored by the DOT and its European Union (EU) 
counterpart took a generally positive view of the ventures, even though it 
called for further study into the alliances’ effects on competition.17   Jeffrey 
Shane, a former DOT official who approved the first alliance application,18 
continues to defend the DOT’s immunization practices, primarily on policy 
grounds.19  At the other end of the spectrum, the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) 
Antitrust Division has criticized antitrust immunity grants consistently, arguing 
there should be an automatic presumption against them.20  Several consumer 
                                                 
 11. See id. 
 12. See Final Order, Defining “Open Skies,” Docket No. 48130, at 3–6 (Dep’t of Transp. 
Aug. 5, 1992), 1992 DOT Av. LEXIS 568 [hereinafter Defining “Open Skies”] (establishing the 
DOT’s official definition of “Open Skies”).  The Open Skies template requires the removal of 
restrictions on routes, fares, and capacity between partners, though it retains the longstanding 
international restrictions on foreign ownership and control.  Id. 
 13. See Statement of United States International Air Transportation Policy, 60 Fed. Reg. 
21,841, 21,841 (May 3, 1995) (promoting “rel[iance] on the marketplace and unrestricted, fair 
competition to determine the variety, quality, and price of air service”). 
 14. The DOS is the other executive entity charged with conducting aviation negotiations 
with foreign partners.  See 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (2006). 
 15. See Joint Application, All Nippon Airways Co., Ltd., Docket No.  
DOT-OST-2009-0350, at 6 n.9 (Dep’t of Transp. Dec. 23, 2009) [hereinafter 
ANA/Continental/United Application] (highlighting that U.S. aviation agreements with the 
Netherlands, Chile, Germany, France, Canada, Italy, and Japan were preconditioned on 
“favorable consideration of antitrust immunity applications” from their respective airlines). 
 16. Compare infra notes 17–19, with infra notes 20–21. 
 17. See EUR. COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 6, at 24–25. 
 18. Northwest/KLM Order to Show Cause, supra note 4, at 23. 
 19. See Warren L. Dean, Jr. & Jeffrey N. Shane, Alliances, Immunity, and the Future of 
Aviation, 22 AIR & SPACE LAW. 1, 17 (2010). 
 20. See J. Bruce McDonald, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Competition in the Air, 
Remarks to the IATA Legal Symposium 2007, Istanbul, Turkey, at 7 (Feb. 12, 2007), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/222159.htm (“DOJ believes there should be a 
presumption against immunity.”); see also Comments of the Department of Justice (Public 
Version), American Airlines, Inc., Docket No. OST-2008-0252, at 22–29 (Dep’t of Transp. Dec. 
21, 2009) (highlighting the DOJ’s latest critiques of a major antitrust immunity application); 
William Gillespie & Oliver M. Richard, Antitrust Immunity and International Airline Alliances 
20 (DOJ, Antitrust Div., Econ. Analysis Grp., Discussion Paper No. EAG-11-1, 2011), available 
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groups, non-alliance airlines, and labor organizations have shared in the DOJ’s 
dissent.21  Meanwhile, academic analysis of immunized alliances reveals 
nothing approaching consensus.22  Professor Brian Havel and other legal 
scholars have been unimpressed with the DOT’s quasi-legal reasoning, 
accusing the DOT of “slouching toward regulatory incoherence.”23  Others, 
like Hubert Horan, have focused on the DOT’s perceived shoddy economic 
analysis of alliance applications and its betrayal of U.S. commitments to a 
deregulated aviation market.24  Both lines of critique suggest a conceptual 
realignment of DOT immunization deliberations along economic or 
jurisprudential lines, but neither approach adequately addresses the 
institutional variables in play.25  This Article intends to fill that lacuna. 
Engaging the highly technical and jargon-laden economic quibbles over 
alliance benefits (or lack thereof) may have some academic purpose, but their 
relevance to the concrete debates over the future of the DOT’s immunity 
powers is questionable.  In lieu of adopting and defending any of the current 
arguments, this Article endeavors to circumvent the ideological stalemate by 
applying recent scholarly insight and the institutional advantages of executive 
agencies over the other branches to highlight their appropriateness in 
advancing the larger policy goals of liberalizing the international air-transport 
market.26  In other words, antitrust immunity should be recognized as a 
                                                                                                                 
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/eag/267513.pdf (“[A]ntitrust immunity is not reasonably 
necessary for alliance participants to deliver pricing efficiencies to connecting passengers.”). 
 21. See, e.g., The Financial State of the Airline Industry and the Implications of 
Consolidation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 111th 
Cong. 23 (2010) (statement of Charles Leocha, Director of Consumer Travel Alliance); id. at  
20–21 (statement of Robert Roach, Jr., General Vice President, International Association of 
Machinists and Aerospace Workers) (testifying against airline consolidations through merges and 
alliances); see also Answer of Virgin Atlantic Airways, American Airlines, Inc., Docket No. 
DOT-OST-2008-0252, at 1–7 (Dep’t of Transp. May 18, 2009) (including Virgin Atlantic’s 
objections to the oneworld Alliance immunity application, but noting that it did not oppose 
alliances in principle). 
 22. Compare, e.g., Volodymyr Bilotkach & Kai Hüschelrath, Antitrust Immunity for Airline 
Alliances, 7 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 335, 380 (2011) (arguing for a reassessment of antitrust 
immunity for alliances based on economic grounds), with Jan K. Brueckner et al., Alliances, 
Codesharing, Antitrust Immunity, and International Airfares: Do Previous Patterns Persist?, 7 J. 
COMP. L. & ECON. 573, 594–96 (2011) (finding that immunized alliances yield consumer-welfare 
benefits while rejecting the DOJ’s antitrust immunity criticisms). 
 23. BRIAN F. HAVEL, BEYOND OPEN SKIES: A NEW REGIME FOR INTERNATIONAL 
AVIATION 297 (2009).  Aside from slight reservations concerning some of his conclusions, 
Havel’s analysis of alliances and the DOT’s immunity powers is extremely thorough.  See id. 
198–208, 287–302. 
 24. See, e.g., Hubert Horan, “Double Marginalization” and the Counter-Revolution Against 
Liberal Airline Competition, 37 TRANSP. L.J. 251, 256–57, 259–60 (2010). 
 25. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
 26. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 
9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613, 1649–50, 1679–81 (2009) 
[hereinafter Posner & Vermeule, Crisis Governance] (discussing institutional advantages held by 
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legitimate agency prerogative until the policy winds shift.27  From this angle, it 
is not imperative that the DOT’s immunization decisions accord with abstract 
standards of economic efficiency or satisfy highly conceptualized, legalist 
interpretations of the statutory language that undergirds the DOT’s immunity 
powers.28  This view may not satisfy antitrust immunity’s more virulent critics, 
but their concerns ring hollow in the political realm.  The congressional cloud 
that briefly hung over the immunization issue in 2009 has passed,29 and the 
                                                                                                                 
executive agencies to address crises); see also Adrian Vermeule, Emergency Lawmaking After 
9/11 and 7/7, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1157, 1189–90 (2008) (advocating for increased deference 
to the executive branch during emergencies); Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative 
Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1101, 1105, 1144 (2009) [hereinafter Vermeule, Schmittian 
Administrative Law] (arguing that the actions of administrative agencies inevitably must be given 
some deference from judicial scrutiny).  The main insights of these articles have been distilled 
into ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010) [hereinafter POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND].  For 
an earlier application of their arguments to national security, see ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY AND THE COURTS (2007) 
[hereinafter POSNER & VERMEULE, TERROR].  Much of the controversy over their work concerns 
their reliance on the work of Carl Schmitt, a political theorist and member of the Nazi Party.  See 
Gene Healy, Hail to the Tyrant, AM. CONSERVATIVE, June 2011, at 38–39 (reviewing POSNER & 
VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, supra); see also Harvey Mansfield, Is the Imperial 
Presidency Inevitable?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2011, at 12 (claiming that Posner and Vermeule 
neither need nor know the work of Carl Schmitt).  Also insightful is Vermeule’s solo work that 
focuses on judicial interpretation and institutional arrangements.  See ADRIAN VERMEULE, 
JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 
(2006) [hereinafter VERMEULE, UNCERTAINTY] (criticizing the application of hard legal rules in 
all circumstances of administrative action); see also ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS 
OF REASON (2009) [hereinafter VERMEULE, REASON].  Although this author agrees with much of 
Posner and Vermeule’s analysis, none of the contentions raised in this Article rely on their strong 
claim that “[w]e live in . . . an age after the separation of powers, and the legally constrained 
executive is now a historical curiosity.”  POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, supra, at 
4. 
 27. See POSNER & VERMEULE, TERROR, supra note 26, at 5 (arguing for deference to 
administrative agencies); see also Posner & Vermeule, Crisis Governance, supra note 26, at 1681 
(arguing for a continuation of deference to executive action). 
 28. See Vermeule, Schmittian Administrative Law, supra note 26, at 1105–06 (explaining 
why the application of hard legal standards is not always suitable for administrative agencies). 
 29. See H.R. 831, 111th Cong. (2009).  Although this piece of legislation, which required 
antitrust immunity for alliances to sunset after three years from the time it was granted, failed to 
take-off on its own, it was eventually attached to several versions of the FAA Reauthorization 
Act. Id. § 1(e).  Former Congressman James Oberstar, who served as Chairman of the House 
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and was an outspoken critic of the alliance system, 
introduced the legislation.  See James L. Oberstar, Chairman, Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 
U.S. House of Representatives, Remarks to the International Aviation Club, Washington, D.C. 
(Mar. 23, 2009), available at http://www.iacwashington.org/Resources/Documents/James 
OberStar/ACspeechMar09.pdf. Current Transportation Chairman John Mica led Congress in 
striking the antitrust immunity reform provisions from the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2011.  See 
Press Release, Transp. & Infrastructure Comm., House Transportation Leaders Introduce FAA 
Bill (Feb. 11, 2011), available at http://transportation.house.gov/News/PRArticle 
.aspx?NewsID=1085. 
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American public, which has paid aviation policy little notice since deregulation 
in the 1970s, has more pressing concerns in the wake of a debilitating 
depression.30  Immunized airline alliances were born out of the sector’s 
deficient trade framework; thus, those seeking an international aviation market 
predicated on pure free-market principles should redirect their reform efforts to 
the elimination of investment restrictions at the domestic and international 
levels.31 
This Article proceeds in five parts.  Part I surveys the DOT’s international 
aviation trade policy and immunization authority while highlighting the DOT’s 
institutional advantages over Congress in these areas.  Part II provides further 
details on airline alliances, their need for antitrust immunity, and the DOT’s 
statutory authority for granting such immunity.  Part III examines two lines of 
criticism against the DOT’s immunization powers and illuminates their 
shortcomings on institutional grounds.  Keeping with institutional 
considerations, Part IV exposes a select number of antitrust immunity reform 
proposals as normatively unattractive.  Part V concludes by looking beyond the 
need for immunity in a hypothetical globalized aviation marketplace.  
I.  INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
A.  Institutional Make-up and Advantages 
The DOT, established in 1967, is dedicated to “ensuring a fast, safe, 
efficient, accessible[,] and convenient transportation system that  
meets . . . vital national interests and enhances the quality of life of the 
American people.”32  This entails monitoring and regulating the nation’s 
transportation infrastructure, including road, rail, maritime, and aviation 
networks through subject-specific offices.33  The DOT’s Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs is responsible for external 
economic regulation,34 such as providing operating licenses,35 promulgating 
consumer-protection rules,36 and granting access rights to foreign air  
                                                 
 30. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND 
THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009) (characterizing the 2008 economic downturn as a 
depression and explaining its causes and effects). 
 31. See, e.g., Hand, supra note 4, at 644–45 (arguing that easing cross-border investments 
restrictions would eliminate the need for antitrust immunity). 
 32. About DOT: What We Do, DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.dot.gov/about (last updated 
Mar. 27, 2012). 
 33. Our Agencies, DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.dot.gov/administrations (last updated 
Sept. 29, 2012).  The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), one of these specific offices, 
regulates aviation safety.  See 49 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
 34. See Asst. Secretary of Aviation & International Affairs, DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
http://www.dot.gov/policy/assistant-secretary-aviation-international-affairs (last updated Sept. 18, 
2012). 
 35. 49 U.S.C. §§ 41101–41103 (2006). 
 36. 49 U.S.C. § 41712 (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
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carriers.37  Unlike the DOT’s predecessor, CAB, the DOT does not regulate 
airline rates, routes, and services comprehensively, nor is the DOT supposed to 
erect high barriers to entry in order to protect incumbents.38  Further, the DOT 
lacks the CAB’s antitrust authority over the domestic air-transport market, but 
it retains the power to immunize international inter-carrier arrangements, 
including airline alliance agreements.39   
As an executive agency, the DOT operates within the orbit of the President’s 
policy preferences.40  As such, the DOT can reasonably be expected to respond 
to shifts in the political winds.41  The DOT shares in the general institutional 
advantages that accrue to agencies by congressional consent.  Namely, the 
DOT can set policy goals, issue rules and rulings, collect information, and 
interface with other agencies—executive or independent—to fulfill these 
various ends.42  The legislative branch regulates the general contours of the 
DOT’s powers, but the DOT has been delegated enough authority to move 
with the requisite speed and knowledge to handle fluctuating aviation-related 
matters.43  The debatable “cost” of this flexibility is that the DOT, like the 
executive branch as a whole, may be subject to few express legal constraints, 
but political monitoring can occasionally constrain agency behavior.44  Even if 
                                                 
 37. 49 U.S.C. § 41301–41304 (2006). 
 38. Compare Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.), with Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703 (codified in scattered sections of Titles 5, 15, 16, 26, 29, and 49 
U.S.C.).  See also Daniel Petroski, Airlines Response to the DTPA Section 1305 Preemption, 56 J. 
AIR L. & COM. 125, 125–30 (1990) (explaining the history of the CAB). 
 39. See Petroski, supra note 38, at 125–30; see also supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. 
 40. See POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, supra note 26, at 57 (noting that 
“recent empirical work suggests that the heads of independent agencies and executive agencies 
tend to have common preferences and beliefs, both aligned with those of the reigning president”). 
 41. See id. 
 42. Admittedly, sometimes this “interfacing” hits bumps in the road, particularly where 
institutional competence is disputed.  See Stephen Labaton, Cracking Down, Antitrust Chief Hits 
Resistance, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2009, at A1 (discussing the behind-the-scenes conflict between 
the DOJ and DOT over antitrust immunity for airline alliances). 
 43. Perhaps the most dramatic example of agency action in recent memory was the FAA’s 
unilateral decision to ground more than 4,000 flights within hours of the attacks on Sept. 11, 
2001.  See Alan Levin et al., Part I: Terror Attacks Brought Drastic Decision: Clear the Skies, 
USA TODAY, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2002-08-11-clearskies_x.htm (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2012). 
 44. Examples of political monitoring include congressional hearings, newspaper reports, 
television exposés, and online forums.  See Michael E. Levine, Why Weren’t the Airlines 
Regulated?, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 269, 273–74, 277–79, 281, 285, 287–88, 290 (2006) (explaining 
the concept of “slack” and the relative regulatory autonomy enjoyed by the DOT, while also 
recognizing the impact of “public agenda” issues and the pressure that they can place on DOT 
policy). 
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the claims of modern executive authority are exaggerated, that does not mean 
the DOT lacks a high degree of institutional autonomy.45   
Professor Michael Levine, a former CAB attorney, argues that airline 
regulatory affairs have rarely been central in public discourse since the 
deregulation movement began in the 1970s.46  It is possible that Congress 
could, at some point, become more involved, particularly if aviation affairs 
once again capture the public’s attention.  For instance, the string of  
high-profile airline failings induced by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks 
brought the U.S. government to the brink of re-regulating the airline industry.47  
More recently, in 2006, public outcry over a proposal that a United Arab 
Emirates-owned company would take control of several U.S. seaports48 
spurred Congress to block a DOT attempt to relax U.S. foreign-investment 
rules for airlines.49  In both instances, however, congressional involvement 
proved fleeting and, with respect to the post-9/11 re-regulation scare, 
inconsequential in the long run.50  As such, it appears safer to conceive of 
                                                 
 45. See id. at 287 (discussing the political forces that led to less regulation in the airline 
industry).  Given that much of the DOT’s administrative subject matter involves highly technical 
problems related to infrastructural issues that, for the most part, receive scant media attention and 
few headlines, its day-to-day regulatory behavior is seldom on the public’s radar.  Although some 
major industry shake-ups involving bankruptcies, mergers, and security have managed to receive 
a fair amount of attention over the years, none of these “attention grabbers” fall directly under 
DOT oversight. 
 46. See Levine, supra note 44, at 277–78, 285–86; see also Webcast: A Conversation with 
Michael E. Levine, INT’L AVIATION LAW INST., DEPAUL UNIV. COLL. OF LAW, 
http://www.law.depaul.edu/centers_institutes/aviation_law/webcast.asp (last visited Sept. 9, 
2012). 
 47. See Brian F. Havel & Michael G. Whitaker, The Approach of Re-Regulation: The 
Airline Industry After September 11, 2001, 20 ISSUES AVIATION L. & POL’Y 4101, 4105–15 
(2004) (detailing the effects of the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 
2001). 
 48. See Deborah M. Mostaghel, Dubai Ports World Under Exon-Florio: A Threat to 
National Security or a Tempest in a Seaport?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 583, 606–07 (2007). 
 49. See Cornelia Woll, Open Skies, Closed Markets: The Importance of Time in the 
Negotiation of International Air Transport 20–22 (July 25, 2009) (unpublished paper presented at 
the 104th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association held in September 
2009), available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450441. 
 50. The 2001 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act expired without 
bringing the airlines under strict governmental control.  See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, 1974 (repealing much of Title 1 of the Stabilization 
Act dealing with aviation).  Congress’s assault on the DOT’s investment gambit arguably remains 
effective insofar as the DOT has not attempted a similar move since.  Conversely, the investment 
modification was intended to lure the European Union (EU) into a liberal air transport treaty and 
the EU solidified the deal in 2007 anyway, so a strong argument could be made that the 
legislative branch’s intervention had no substantive impact on DOT policy.  See Woll, supra note 
49, at 2. 
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congressional constraints on the DOT’s aviation portfolio as subject to 
vacillating public interests—a conclusion that is theoretically plausible.51  
B.  Advantages in International Aviation Policy 
Although the DOT’s domestic regulatory power over air transport represents 
a decline from the heyday of the CAB, the DOT still wields considerable 
control over the external facets of U.S. aviation law and policy.52  Under 
federal statute, the DOT—in cooperation with the DOS—is assigned the role 
of “develop[ing] a negotiating policy emphasizing the greatest degree of 
competition compatible with a well-functioning international air transportation 
system.”53  Congress enumerates nine policy points for departments to 
consider.54  All of them, however, are stated at a high level of generality and 
emanate from prior executive policy commitments.55  For example, the first 
point—“strengthening the competitive position of air carriers to ensure at least 
equality [of opportunity] with foreign air carriers”—is only accompanied by a 
request that U.S. airlines be able to “maintain and increase their profitability in 
foreign air transportation.”56  Congress leaves it to the DOS and DOT to craft 
the particulars.57  Moreover, the statute does not provide clear guidance on 
how much weight should be assigned to each point, nor does it prevent the 
DOT from developing additional policy terms broadly consistent with the 
statute.58  To the extent that aviation policy must be formed with an eye toward 
                                                 
 51. Cf. Levine, supra note 44, at 295–97 (speculating on means to empirically verify the 
role public attention has played in U.S. aviation policy) 
 52. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101(e), 41301 (2006); see also supra notes 12–13. 
 53. 49 U.S.C. § 40101(e) (2006). 
 54. Id. § 40101(e)(1)–(9). 
 55. The statute’s policy points were originally a part of the International Air Transportation 
Competition Act of 1979 that, in turn, was born out of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.  
Compare International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-192, § 2, 94 
Stat. 35, with Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 1705,  
1705–07 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).  See also Michael T. Pinto, The 
International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, 9 DENV. J. INT’L L. 261, 261 (1980).  
The deregulation agenda, including its liberalizing terms for domestic and international aviation, 
was first developed under the auspices of the CAB and its former Chairman, Alfred Kahn.  See 
Paul Stephen Dempsey, Turbulence in the “Open Skies”: The Deregulation of International Air 
Transport, 15 TRANSP. L.J. 305, 325–27 (1987); see also id. at 329–42 (recounting the CAB and 
Carter Administration’s pro-liberalization negotiating framework for international aviation). 
 56. 49 U.S.C. § 40101(e)(1). 
 57. Id. § 40101(e). 
 58. Id.  This is unsurprising given that Congress possesses no particular competence over 
international aviation policy.  Cf. POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, supra note 26, 
at 26 (observing “the relative lack of legislative expertise” and that Congress “lacks the raw 
information that [administrative] experts need to make assessments”).  Further, Congress does not 
have the institutional structures to generate relevant information to the same degree that a 
transportation-savvy agency does.  The DOT, for instance, has the Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics to compile and analyze multimodal transportation data.  See About BTS, RES.  
& INNOVATION TECH. ADMIN., BUREAU OF TRANSP. STAT., http://www.bts.gov/about/ (last 
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international political relations,59 the DOS is well situated to blend its 
institutional advantages with those of the DOT to put muscle and flesh on the 
aviation policy bones left by Congress.60     
Congress’s assignment of negotiating authority to the DOS, in consultation 
with the DOT, further confirms this understanding, and it is in line with the 
DOT’s articulated policy goals.61  Though Congress vests itself, through the 
President, with the ability to send one representative from each house to 
observe international aviation negotiations,62 it rarely does.63  History has 
shown that Congress is willing to defer to the President’s international trade 
policy choices, even with respect to far-reaching trade accords with economic 
and social consequences that exceed those of aviation agreements by 
significant magnitudes.64  By and large, the development and execution of U.S. 
international aviation trade policy remains an executive prerogative carried out 
                                                                                                                 
visited Sept. 10, 2012).  With respect to international aviation in particular, the DOT has a 
dedicated division “[t]o coordinate, develop, and execute international aviation transportation 
policy.”  OFF. INT’L AVIATION, DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.dot.gov/policy/aviation 
-policy/office-international-aviation (last updated Aug. 30, 2012).  Although Congress can rely on 
agency-produced information as well as direct agencies to generate particular types of 
information, this only shows that the legislative branch may possess an epistemic advantage over 
the judiciary, which is far more constrained in terms of informational access.  See VERMEULE, 
REASON, supra note 26, at 1–9 (introducing arguments for why the legislative branch has an 
institutional advantage over the judiciary).  Agencies remain on the “front lines” of their assigned 
subject matter; Congress appears later. 
 59. See Statement of United States International Air Transportation Policy, 60 Fed. Reg. 
21,841, 21,843–84 (May 3, 1995) (surveying the international relations issues in play). 
 60. See id. at 21,845–46 (discussing the importance of transnational agreements and 
political pressure in effecting favorable agreements). 
 61. See id. § 40105(c).  Although it is true that the DOT and DOS are directed to consult 
with aviation stakeholders, such as airports, airlines, and labor, “on broad policy goals and 
individual negotiations,” the agencies are only required to do so “to the maximum extent 
practicable” or, in other words, at their discretion.  Id. 
 62. See id. § 40105(d). 
 63. See, e.g., Derek Lick, Note, More Turbulence Ahead: A Bumpy Ride During  
U.S.-Japanese Aviation Talks Exemplifies the Need for a Pragmatic Course in Future Aviation 
Negotiations, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1207, 1267 (1998) (noting that, during negotiations 
between U.S. and Japanese airlines, Senator Jesse Helms “became so disturbed at the direction 
U.S. negotiators were going with the aviation talks that he sent staff members of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee to observe the August 1997 discussions”). 
 64. For instance, U.S. accession to both the North American Free Trade Agreement and the 
World Trade Organization Agreement were secured through the “fast track” authority given to the 
President by Congress.  See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. 
No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3311–3473); see also Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified in scattered 
sections of 19 U.S.C.).  Although the availability of fast-track, or “trade promotion,” authority has 
lapsed under the Obama Administration, its longstanding role in U.S. international trade relations 
suggests that it will return when political temperaments concerning trade and globalization adjust 
to current worldwide economic circumstances.  See generally Robert E. Baldwin, U.S. Trade 
Policy Since 1934: An Uneven Path Toward Greater Trade Liberalization (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 15397, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15397/. 
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under the auspices of the DOS and DOT.65  The policy space left by Congress 
allows the DOT to create an “Open Skies” negotiating template that seeks to 
remove many market access restrictions at the international level.66  These 
accords have often come at the price of antitrust dispensations for foreign air 
carriers seeking to forge deeply integrated alliances with U.S. airlines.67  
Notably, Congress, has not taken an express position on this mode of 
exchange, choosing instead to monitor the matter at irregular intervals.68 
Although few international aviation analysts quibble with the liberalization 
ethos of Open Skies,69 some have questioned the wisdom of incorporating 
antitrust immunity into the agenda.70  Despite these critiques, mainly academic 
in nature, Congress remains unmoved.71  Interest groups’ concerns, such as 
those expressed by organized labor72 and consumer watchdogs,73 have also 
                                                 
 65. See supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text. 
 66. The DOT’s policy does not remove all market restrictions.  For instance, Open Skies 
does not provide foreign investment opportunities or cabotage privileges such as the right of a 
foreign airline to serve domestic routes within another state’s territory.  See generally Defining 
“Open Skies”, supra note 12.  See also Current Model Open Skies Agreement Text, DEP’T OF 
STATE, at arts. 2–4 (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ata/114866.htm. 
 67. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text. 
 68. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-95-99, INTERNATIONAL 
AVIATION: AIRLINE ALLIANCES PRODUCE BENEFITS, BUT EFFECT ON COMPETITION UNCERTAIN 
2 (1995); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-RCED-98-131, AVIATION COMPETITION: 
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION ALLIANCES AND THE INFLUENCE OF AIRLINE MARKETING 
PRACTICES 1 (1998); see also International Aviation Alliances: Market Turmoil and the Future of 
Airline Competition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Business Rights, and 
Competition of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Nov. 7, 2001); supra note 29 
(discussing the failed attempt of former Congressman James Oberstar to reign in the DOT’s 
antitrust immunity powers). 
 69. See Xiaowen Fu et al., Air Transport Liberalization and Its Impacts on Airline 
Competition and Air Passenger Traffic, 49 TRANSP. J. 24, 25 (2010) (highlighting the impacts of 
liberalization on the international air markets); see also Anca Cristea & David Hummels, 
Estimating the Gains from Liberalizing Services Trade: The Case of Passenger Aviation 6-7 
(Sept. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (discussing the link between Open Skies Agreements, 
price changes, and demand, and noting that strict regulation “discourag[ed] efficiency and 
innovation”), available at http://econ.la.psu.edu/papers/Hummels91611.pdf.  Despite these 
benefits, the worldwide economic decline that began in 2008 has limited some of the projected 
gains from air transport liberalization.  See, e.g., Dipasis Bhadra & Roger Schaufele, Impact of 
U.S.-EU Open Aviation Area Treaty on U.S. Aviation: A Parametric Analysis with Simulation, 48 
TRANSP. RESEARCH FORUM 65, 67–72 (2009). 
 70. See, e.g., HAVEL, supra note 23, at 301–02; Horan, supra note 24, at 283–86. 
 71. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing a failed effort in Congress to limit 
the DOT’s authority to grant antitrust immunity). 
 72. See Bartholomew Sullivan, Labor Unions Announce a Partnership to Counter Global 
Airline Alliances, COM. APPEAL (Apr. 20, 2011, 5:20 PM), 
http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2011/apr/20/labor-unions-announce-partnership-counter 
-global-a/. 
 73. See Charlie Leocha, Airline Alliance Realities: Airlines Win, Consumers Lose, 
CONSUMER TRAVELER (Mar. 26, 2009), http://www.consumertraveler.com/today/airline-alliance 
-realities-airlines-win-consumers-lose/. 
150 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 62:139 
been unsuccessful, perhaps because they failed to marshal strong public 
support.  None of these objections, however, take to heart the institutional 
advantages the DOT possesses with respect to forming international aviation 
policy and executing that policy in cooperation with the DOS.74  These 
objections miss the point: even though antitrust immunity for alliances may be 
“bad” or trading Open Skies-for-Immunity fails to comport with some abstract 
notion of how international aviation is “supposed” to work,75 there is no  
ready-at-hand institutional alternative to the status quo.76 
II.  THE WAYS AND MEANS OF ANTITRUST IMMUNITY 
A.  Historical Background 
Since the inception of international aviation’s modern legal regime in 
1944,77 airlines seeking foreign market access rights have been tethered to a 
series of domestic and international restrictions.78  This framework requires 
airlines to remain “substantially owned” and “effectively controlled” by 
nationals of their home states (i.e., the state in which an airline is incorporated 
and has its principal place of business).79  Although the exact meaning of the 
ownership/control criteria remains unclear,80 particularly as a matter of 
international law,81 the effect of this restrictive dyad is unambiguous: no single 
airline is legally permitted to develop an autonomous global-route network, 
whether through the acquisition of foreign airlines or the establishment of 
                                                 
 74. See infra Part IV (detailing the various complaints and proposed alternative paths to the 
current alliance-granting regime). 
 75. Distributional goals are at the heart of both labor and consumer-advocacy objections.  
Organized labor fears, perhaps rightly, that alliances allow U.S. airlines to outsource jobs by 
shifting international carriage to foreign airlines with lower cost structures.  See Sullivan, supra 
note 72.  Consumers who fear higher ticket prices and decreased service offerings are 
understandably suspicious that allied airlines are extracting economic rents through their  
cartel-like behavior.  See Leocha, supra note 73. 
 76. See infra Part IV (raising and dismissing alternatives to the status quo). 
 77. See generally Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature Dec. 7, 
1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (entered into force Apr. 4, 1947).  See also Brian F. Havel 
& Gabriel S. Sanchez, Do We Need a New Chicago Convention?, 11 ISSUES AVIATION L. & 
POL’Y 7, 10 (2011) (defending the current regime on pragmatic grounds). 
 78. See Havel & Sanchez, supra note 7, at 644–48. 
 79. Id. at 648–53. 
 80. The “control” criterion is, at best, ambiguous and lends itself to a case-by-case analysis 
of an airline’s management structure, contracts, and financial arrangements.  See Recommended 
Decision of Administrative Law Judge, DHL Airways, Inc. (ASTAR), Docket No.  
OST-2002-13089-594, at 35–38 (Dep’t of Transp. Dec. 19, 2003), 2003 DOT Av. LEXIS 1086 
(discussing the interpretation of “actual control” in U.S. administrative law). 
 81. This is because aviation agreements, unlike domestic legal codes, fail to provide a 
numeric benchmark for “ownership.”  See, e.g., Air Transport Agreement, U.S.-EU, Apr. 30, 
2007, 46 ILM 467.  As in U.S. domestic law, “control” remains undefined.  See supra note 80. 
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subsidiaries abroad.82  For instance, Germany’s Lufthansa cannot merge with 
United Airlines, because a German owned-and-controlled United would violate 
both U.S. domestic law and treaty commitments.83  Major air-transport markets 
such as China and Russia could, under the terms of their air services 
agreements (ASAs) with the United States, revoke United’s privilege to fly to 
and from their respective territories on the grounds that United is no longer 
owned-and-controlled by American citizens.84  Because more than ninety 
percent of all extant ASAs feature “nationality clauses” of this sort,85 it is 
nearly impossible for an international airline to have a foreign-ownership 
profile while successfully accessing lucrative markets.86 
Against this backdrop, airlines have sought to circumvent ownership 
restrictions by forging alliances with foreign airlines that would allow them to 
create a global-route network while continuing to behave like a single, merged 
entity.87  Although the earliest alliances that emerged in the early 1990s were 
bilateral in nature,88 today’s market landscape boasts three major global 
alliances—oneworld, SkyTeam, and Star—comprised of several large 
international airlines accompanied by a series of smaller, regional airlines.89  
                                                 
 82. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 40102(a)(15), 41101(a), 41102(a) (2006); see also supra notes 8–10 
and accompanying text.  The one notable exception to this situation is the European Union’s 
formation of a common aviation market that allows intra-EU cross-border mergers such as Air 
France/KLM and British Airways/Iberia.  See MARTIN STANILAND, A EUROPE OF THE AIR?  THE 
AIRLINE INDUSTRY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 267–68 (2008).  One should be careful not to 
make too much of this, however, because the EU behaves at least as a single quasi-state for 
economic purposes. ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM 92 (2009). 
 83. See Havel & Sanchez, supra note 7, at 640–41. 
 84. See Civil Air Transport Agreement, U.S.-China, arts. 3–4, Sept. 17, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 
4559; see also Air Transport Agreement, U.S.-Rus., arts. 3–4, Jan. 14, 1994, KAV 3785, 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/114333.pdf.  Though both agreements 
have been amended over the years, their ownership and control criteria remain in force. 
 85. See Council for Trade in Services, Quantitative Air Services Agreements Review 
(QUASAR): Part B: Preliminary Results, at 33, ¶ 61, S/C/W/270/Add.1 (Nov. 30, 2006). 
 86. However, some states are exhibiting greater tolerance for foreign investment in their 
national airlines while enforcement of nationality clauses wanes.  See Havel & Sanchez, supra 
note 7, at 654–58 (discussing selective U.S. waivers to nationality clause violations, the creation 
of a unified EU aviation market, and airline lobbying efforts to erode nationality clauses); see 
also Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5, at 26–28 (discussing the potential for relaxed ownership 
restrictions in the context of Canada/EU aviation relations).  The cold truth still remains that these 
restrictions could be invoked at any time and thus far have successfully dissuaded major  
cross-border mergers from taking place.  See, e.g., Havel & Sanchez, supra note 7, at 653–54 
(explaining how the United States invoked nationality rules to prevent a proposed airline merger). 
 87. Northwest/KLM Order to Show Cause, supra note 4, at 4; Order to Show Cause, United 
Airlines, Inc. and Deutsche Lufthansa, A.G., Docket No. OST-96-1116, at 1 (Dep’t of Transp. 
May 9, 1996), 1996 DOT Av. LEXIS 300 [hereinafter United/Lufthansa Order to Show Cause]; 
Volodymyr Bilotkach & Kai Hüschelrath, Airlines Alliances and Antitrust Policy: The Role of 
Efficiencies, 21 J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 76, 78 (2012). 
 88. See, e.g., Northwest/KLM Order to Show Cause, supra note 4, at 4; United/Lufthansa 
Order to Show Cause, supra note 87, at 1 (Dep’t of Transp. May 9, 1996). 
 89. See Bilotkach & Hüschelrath, supra note 87, at 76. 
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For example, the Star Alliance—anchored by United Airlines and  
Lufthansa—has twenty-seven members, including Air Canada, Singapore 
Airlines, and Japan’s All Nippon Airways.90  Though not every member is 
integrated into the alliance with full antitrust immunity, the main actors are.91  
Immunized airlines are allowed to structure their commercial operations as if 
they are a single, merged entity, including abandoning routes where the 
members once competed.92  Each of the big three global alliances share with its 
members a common marketing scheme and pool its consumer perquisite 
programs, such as frequent flyer miles and airport lounge access.93  More 
controversially, alliance members are, in accordance with marching orders 
implied by the DOT,94 committed to “metal neutrality,” “an industry term 
meaning that the partners in an alliance are indifferent as to which operates the 
‘metal’ (aircraft) when they jointly market services.”95  Thus, instead of metal-
neutral alliance members divvying up their revenues based on the amount of 
carriage each conducts, an alliance member can be compensated for 
performing no service at all.96  
Unsurprisingly, alliances raise competition concerns to varying degrees 
depending on the regulatory culture of the concerned states and the extent to 
which the airlines have been able to “sell” the consumer benefits.97  Further, 
                                                 
 90. See Member Airlines, STAR ALLIANCE http://www.staralliance.com/en/about/member 
_airlines/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2012). 
 91. Bill Poling, Star Alliance Gets Continental and Antitrust Immunity, TRAVEL WKLY. 
(July 10, 2009), http://www.travelweekly.com/Travel-News/Airline-News/Star-Alliance-gets 
-Continental-and-antitrust-immunity/. 
 92. A base-level aspect of alliance integration is the practice of code-sharing, whereby 
alliance partners place their identifier codes on the same flight, regardless of which airline 
provides the carriage.  Under this practice, United Airlines can sell seats on flights between 
Washington, D.C., and Madrid, Spain, with its identification code on the ticket while Irish airline 
Aer Lingus uses its aircraft and crew to provide the actual service.  See Press Release, United 
Airlines, United Airlines, Aer Lingus Announce Codeshare and Frequent Flyer Cooperation (Apr. 
8, 2008), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/04/08/idUS108695+08-Apr 
-2008+PRN20080408. 
 93. Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5, at 37. 
 94. Though the term has only recently appeared on DOT decisions, the existence of “metal 
neutrality” in a heavily integrated alliance agreement now appears to be an established 
requirement for antitrust immunity.  See, e.g., Order, Air Canada, Docket No.  
DOT-OST-2008-0234, at 4, 10 (Dep’t of Transp. Nov. 14, 2011); Show Cause Order, Delta 
Airlines, Inc., Docket No. DOT-OST-2009-0155, at 2 n.4 (Dep’t of Transp.  May 10, 2011), 2011 
DOT Av. LEXIS 223; see also Bilotkach & Hüschelrath, supra note 87, at 80–81 (providing a 
more detailed explication of the metal-neutral concept). 
 95. Show Cause Order, American Airlines, Inc., Docket No. DOT-OST-2008-0252, at 4 n.6 
(Dep’t of Transp. Feb. 13, 2010), 2010 DOT Av. LEXIS 136 [hereinafter oneworld Alliance 
Order]. 
 96. See Bilotkach & Hüschelrath, supra note 87, at 80–81. 
 97. See oneworld Alliance Order, supra note 95, at 2–3 (summarizing concerns over 
immunizing the oneworld Alliance but finding the benefits great enough to warrant antitrust 
immunity). 
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every major industrial and post-industrial economy has competition or antitrust 
rules that frown upon the type of cartelization in which alliances engage.98  In 
the United States, the Sherman and Clayton Acts are intended to function as a 
bulwark against typical alliance behavior insofar as the Sherman Act prohibits 
“[e]very contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy in restraint of trade or 
commerce,”99 while the Clayton Act targets the acquisition of monopoly power 
through mergers.100  Presumably, the existence of these statutes, along with the 
matrix of public and private interests in seeing them vigorously enforced 
against commercial entities, should have converged to strangle alliances.101  
But, because of the aviation industry’s unique regulatory history, allied airlines 
can supplicate the DOT to shield them from antitrust exposure.102 
Without getting bogged down in the details of aviation’s ancien régime, it is 
necessary to note that the CAB enjoyed many privileges before the policy 
revolution that prompted deregulation in the 1970s103 and the termination of 
the CAB in 1984.104  These included monitoring, approving, and, if needed, 
immunizing all airline mergers and inter-carrier commercial agreements 
without direct recourse from U.S. antitrust statutes.105  Because cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions were prohibited under domestic and international 
law, the CAB primarily directed international regulatory authority to approve 
transnational price-fixing schemes brokered by the industry’s global trade 
group, the International Air Transport Association (IATA).106  Alliances were 
not yet on the radar.107  The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 slightly modified 
                                                 
 98. See TONY A. FREYER, ANTITRUST AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM: 1930-2004, at 1–7 (2006) 
(introducing an explanation of the reason for and the extent of global antitrust rules). 
 99. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 100. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2006) (described as “[a]n Act to protect trade and commerce 
against unlawful restraints and monopolies”). 
 101. But see Jerry L. Beane, The Antitrust Implications of Airline Deregulation, 45 J. AIR L. 
& COM. 1001, 1001–04 (1980) (noting that “[c]ompetition was a secondary consideration in the 
economic regulation of the aviation industry”). 
 102. See id. at 1001–03 (explaining how deregulation led to the demise of automatic antitrust 
immunity); see also supra note 32 and accompanying text (describing the primary mission of the 
DOT, which does not include antitrust management). 
 103. See Beane, supra note 101, at 1001. 
 104. See Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703 
(codified in scattered sections of Titles 5, 15, 16, 26, 29, and 49 U.S.C.). 
 105. See Beane, supra note 101, at 1008, 1011 (describing privileges afforded to the CAB to 
immunize airline agreements from antitrust liability before deregulation). 
 106. See Brian F. Havel & Gabriel S. Sanchez, International Air Transport Association, in 
HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE REGIMES 755, 756–60 (Christian 
Tietje & Alan Brouder eds., 2009). 
 107. See James Reitzes & Diana Moss, Airline Alliances and Systems Competition, 45 
HOUSE. L. REV. 293, 303–04 (2008) (examining the history of antitrust immunity and airline 
alliances, which attracted greater scrutiny in the years following the DOT’s first grant of 
immunity in 1992). 
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the CAB’s antitrust powers.108  After 1984, Congress transferred these powers 
to the DOT before this authority, with respect to domestic aviation, expired in 
1989.109  Today, U.S. airlines remain subject to antitrust statutes with respect 
to domestic transactions like the 2010 Continental/United Airlines merger,110 
predatory pricing, and other allegedly anticompetitive behavior.111  With 
respect to the international arena, however, Congress allowed the DOT to 
retain the old CAB powers112 because the global aviation marketplace 
remained a heavily regulated environment.  The marketplace remained heavily 
regulated due to the aforementioned restrictions on foreign airline ownership113 
and the unwillingness of states to grant open-market access rights to foreign 
airlines.114  Despite the steady erosion of these market-access barriers over the 
past twenty years, nationality restrictions remain at the forefront of airline 
alliance apologetics for antitrust immunity.115   
That is only part of the story.  From the inception of the first airline alliance 
in 1992—a joint venture between the extinct Northwest Airlines and Dutch 
flag carrier KLM—U.S. aviation policymakers saw an opportunity to use 
immunity grants as a coin of exchange in pursuit of Open Skies agreements 
with foreign governments.116  Although these agreements initially offered only 
“sympathetic consideration” for immunity applications from alliances 
comprised of carriers from states that had signed-on to the Open Skies 
template,117 Open Skies-for-Immunity quickly became the new order of the 
day.118  Indeed, the DOT’s immunization quasi-jurisprudence now confirms 
                                                 
 108. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 30(a), 92 Stat. 1705, 1731 
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (2006)) (allowing the Board to exempt a specific 
transaction from antitrust laws if it was “required in the public interest”). 
 109. See Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984 § 3 (transferring authority to the DOT 
and sunsetting that authority in 1989); see also Dean & Shane, supra note 19, at 18. 
 110. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, United Airlines and Cont’l Airlines Transfer Assets 
to Southwest Airlines in Response to Dep’t of Justice’s Antitrust Concerns (Aug. 27, 2010), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/August/10-at-974.html. 
 111. See Gustavo Mathias Alves Pinto, Competition and Predation in the Airline Industry, 74 
J. AIR L. & COM. 3, 5–9 (2009) (detailing the main allegations of predatory behavior in the airline 
industry). 
 112. Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984 § 9(f); see also Dean & Shane, supra note 
19, at 18. 
 113. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 114. See Havel & Sanchez, supra note 77, at 8. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See Reitzes & Moss, supra note 107, at 304–05. 
 117. See, e.g., Northwest/KLM Order, supra note 4, at 1, 3 (quoting the 1992 Memorandum 
of Consultations between the United States and the Netherlands); Order Granting Approval and 
Antitrust Immunity for an Alliance Expansion Agreement, United Air Lines, Inc., Docket No. 
OST-2003-14202, at 1–2 & n.5 (Dep’t of Transp. May 14, 2003), 2003 DOT Av. LEXIS 357 
[hereinafter United/Asiana Order] (citing the Memorandum of Consultations between the United 
States and the Republic of Korea). 
 118. See Defining “Open Skies”, supra note 12; see also Dean & Shane, supra note 19, at 17. 
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that an Open Skies agreement is conditio sine qua non for antitrust immunity, 
while alliance applications themselves do not hide the fact that “no immunity” 
means “no Open Skies.”119  This reality has not sat well with a handful of 
stakeholders and academics, all of whom have argued that the DOT is bound to 
statutory rules that dictate the terms under which immunization may be 
offered.120 
B.  Legal Framework 
The statutory rules governing antitrust immunity grants have arguably 
played an ambiguous role in DOT decision-making.121  Under a two-step 
framework, the DOT is required first to approve or deny an alliance agreement 
between U.S. airlines and one or more foreign air carriers and, second, to 
determine whether or not to extend antitrust immunity to an approved 
agreement.122  Although the DOT may, without antitrust immunity, approve 
alliance arrangements with foreign airlines from states that have not signed an 
Open Skies agreement, these airlines are unable to take advantage of the 
standard menu of alliance activities without risking an antitrust lawsuit.123  
Thus, those airlines seeking high-octane alliance benefits seek both approval 
and immunity when submitting their petitions to the DOT.124  Even then, the 
DOT can choose to offer approval without immunity, but such instances are 
rare and can be remedied through a subsequent petition.125  The typical 
scenario involves the approval dog wagging its immunity tail without much 
incident.126 
More formally, under 49 U.S.C. § 41309, which governs the first step, the 
DOT is directed to approve an alliance so long as the “cooperative 
arrangement” is “not adverse to the public interest” nor in violation of other 
                                                 
 119. See, e.g., ANA/Continental/United Application, supra note 15, at 6 n.9 (stating that in 
the recent U.S.-Japan negotiations, “the Japanese delegation unambiguously communicated that 
U.S. approval of [the ANA/Continental/United] Joint Application [for antitrust immunity] on 
terms acceptable to the Japanese government is a condition precedent to the entry into force of 
Open Skies”); Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5, at 37. 
 120. See Dean & Shane, supra note 19, at 20; see also infra Part III.A–B (discussing 
additional critiques). 
 121. See infra notes 181–83 (surveying Havel’s critique that the DOT has failed to follow the 
statutes that underlie its antitrust immunity powers). 
 122. See Dean & Shane, supra note 19, at 18–19; see also Gillespie & Richard, supra note 
20, at 5–6 (explaining that an alliance may be granted without a grant of antitrust immunity). 
 123. See Hand, supra note 4, at 656. 
 124. See Dean & Shane, supra note 19, at 21. 
 125. See, e.g., Order to Show Cause, Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-S.P.A., Docket No.  
OST-2004-19214, at 2 (Dep’t of Transp.  Dec. 22, 2005), 2005 DOT Av. LEXIS 820 [hereinafter 
SkyTeam I Order] (granting SkyTeam approval but no antitrust immunity).  But see Show Cause 
Order, Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-S.p.A., Order to Show Cause, Docket No. OST-2007-28644, 
at 1 (Dep’t of Transp. Apr. 9, 2008) [hereinafter Skyteam II Order] (granting SkyTeam’s revised 
application for antitrust immunity). 
 126. See Dean & Shane, supra note 19, at 19. 
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statutory criteria related to airline operating fitness.127  This requires the DOT 
to question whether the proposed alliance would “substantially reduce[] or 
eliminate[] competition”128 and, if so, whether “the agreement . . . is necessary 
to meet a serious transportation need or to achieve important public benefits 
including international comity and foreign policy considerations.”129  Further, 
the DOT must determine whether “the transportation need cannot be met or 
those benefits cannot be achieved by reasonably available alternatives that are 
materially less anticompetitive.”130  Because all alliances, by their nature, 
“substantially reduce[] or eliminate[] competition,” the DOT has never been 
able to dispense with an ostensibly full-bodied approval analysis.131   
Approval, however, does not mean immunization.  The DOT is purportedly 
restricted to granting antitrust immunity only “to the extent necessary to allow 
the [airlines] to proceed with the [alliance] transaction,” and only if the DOT 
“decides it is required by the public interest.”132  Though past DOT decisions 
have reinforced the idea that applicant airlines must make a “strong showing” 
that their arrangement is in the “public interest” and would not go forward but 
for immunization,133 they are far from bastions of clarity.  For instance, 
although the term “public interest” appears in both the approval and 
immunization statutory steps, and the DOT claims to have “always recognized 
that the public interest standard [for antitrust immunity] is a much more 
stringent standard than [the alliance approval] public interest standard,”134 
there is no avoiding the term’s vagueness or the DOT’s discretionary use, or 
lack, of stringency.135  Moreover, the idea that the DOT, an external observer, 
                                                 
 127. 49 U.S.C. § 41309(b) (2006); see also Gillespie & Richard, supra note 20, at 5. 
 128. This language is from the Clayton Act.  See 49 U.S.C. § 41309(b)(1) (2006); see also 
Order, Air Canada, DOT-OST-2008-0234, at 5 (Dep’t of Transp. Nov. 14, 2011), 2011 DOT Av. 
LEXIS 492 [hereinafter Order Joining Brussels Airlines to the Star Alliance] (discussing the 
Clayton Act and its application). 
 129. 49 U.S.C. § 41309(b)(1)(A). 
 130. Id. § 41309(b)(1)(B). 
 131. Id. § 41309(b)(1)(A); see also Reitzes & Moss, supra note 107, at 307 (describing the 
benefits of immunized alliances but noting their ability to negatively affect competition). 
 132. 49 U.S.C. § 41308(b) (2006).  With respect to limiting the scope of antitrust immunity, 
the DOT may, at its discretion, “carve out” certain international air routes from an immunity 
grant, though it appears to be drifting away from that practice.  See oneworld Alliance Order, 
supra note 95, at 25–26 (citing economic data to justify not carving out routes from the 2010 
oneworld Alliance application).  In addition to carve-outs, the DOT may order alliance members 
to surrender some of their take-off and landing rights (“slots”) at congested airports in order to 
attract new entrants.  See id. at 26. 
 133. See, e.g., United/Lufthansa Order to Show Cause, supra note 87, at 15–16. 
 134. SkyTeam I Order, supra note 125, at 32. 
 135. Compare Order Joining Brussels Airlines to the Star Alliance, supra note 128, at 9 
(weighing enhanced competition, cost efficiencies, and new airline routes when granting antitrust 
immunity), with SkyTeam I Order, supra note 125, at 34 (deciding that efficiency from the 
combination of previously approved alliance agreements was not a sufficient public benefit for a 
broad grant of antitrust immunity). 
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has keen enough insight to know with absolute certainty whether an alliance 
transaction will go forward with or without immunity borders on the ludicrous.  
Given the antitrust risks involved with an alliance, coupled with the stiff 
statutory penalties, it is difficult to imagine a consortium of airlines proceeding 
to engage in routine alliance behavior without immunization.136 
As noted, in addition to these statutory criteria, it is “established  
policy . . . [that] the existence of an ‘open-skies’ framework [between the U.S. 
and foreign airlines’ homelands] is a necessary predicate to [the DOT’s] 
consideration of requests for antitrust immunity.”137  So, too, is “metal 
neutral[ity].”138  Moreover, although industry stakeholders and government 
officials are permitted to submit filings during the alliance application process, 
the DOT is not required by law to consult with any other agency, including 
antitrust officials at the DOJ.139  This means that, legally, the DOT possesses 
plenipotentiary powers over alliance approval and immunization even though it 
is not authorized to handle competition law and policy generally.140  Further, 
because no DOT alliance immunity decision has been appealed to federal 
court, there is no clear jurisprudence clarifying or constraining these 
immunization powers.141  Certain older decisions, handed down during the 
CAB’s reign over airline antitrust affairs, may be construed to inform the 
nature of DOT immunization authority today,142 but they appear to have no 
effect on DOT decisions in practice.143  
III.  TWO LINES OF CRITIQUE 
Considering the strength of the DOT’s antitrust immunity powers and the 
apparent absence of legal checks on its institutional authority, it should come 
as no surprise that twenty years’ worth of immunity grants have raised the 
                                                 
 136. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006) (making a Sherman Act violation punishable by up to ten 
years in prison, a $100 million fine, or both). 
 137. oneworld Alliance Order, supra note 95, at 3. 
 138. Id. at 5 & n.14. 
 139. See 49 U.S.C. § 41309(b) (2006) (granting the DOT sole authority to approve a 
proposed airline alliance).  But see id. § 41309(c) (requiring the DOT to give the DOS and the 
Attorney General notice and an opportunity to comment on all applications). 
 140. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 43–44 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing the DOJ 
and FTC’s roles in enforcing the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts). 
 141. But see Republic Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 756 F.3d 1304, 1318 (8th Cir. 
1985) (applying a rational basis test when reviewing an antitrust exemption issued by the  
now-defunct CAB). 
 142. See Comments of the Department of Justice on the Show Cause Order (Public Version), 
Air Canada, Docket No. OST-2008-0234, at 12–13 (Dep’t of Transp. Jun. 26, 2009) [hereinafter 
DOJ Comments on Star Alliance Show Cause Order] (citing Republic Airlines, 756 F.2d at 1317). 
 143. See, e.g., Final Order, Air Canada, Docket No. OST-2008-0234, at 7–10 (Dep’t of 
Transp. Jul. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Star Alliance Final Order] (rejecting the DOJ’s suggestions to 
deny an amended application requesting immunity); see also DOJ Comments on Star Alliance 
Show Cause Order, supra note 142. 
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hackles of certain stakeholders and academics,144 nor should there be any 
shock that the DOJ, the government’s primary competition law enforcer, has 
routinely expressed its disapproval of alliance immunization.145  Although 
interest group objections help reveal the extent to which the alliance system 
has reorganized the international aviation market and clarify whom the winners 
and losers are within the framework, they are of ancillary relevance here.146  
Special interest lobbying has been unsuccessful in guiding the DOT’s 
regulatory hand and spurring lawmakers to reform the immunization 
statutes.147  There are two distinct, yet interrelated, trajectories of complaints 
against the DOT’s immunization grants: economic and legalist.  Because these 
two concerns carry the potential to inform public discourse on the future of 
antitrust immunity for alliances and have been areas of focus for academic 
critics,148 they warrant specified treatment.  They are both, however, ultimately 
irrelevant on institutional grounds.149 
A.  Ersatz Economics? 
The economic literature on airline alliances is as vast as it is contentious, 
allowing both alliance supporters and critics to claim the empirical high ground 
in debates concerning immunity grants.150  The standard theoretical defense of 
immunized alliances is that they provide unprecedented network benefits to 
consumers, allowing consumers living in relatively small aviation markets to 
access thousands of destinations worldwide.151  Even though the formation of 
                                                 
 144. See, e.g., Hand, supra note 4, at 658–62 (criticizing the DOT’s grant of antitrust 
immunity for the Star Alliance’s A++ alliance agreement). 
 145. See, e.g., DOJ Comments on Star Alliance Show Cause Order, supra note 142, at 1 
(arguing that laws granting antitrust immunity “should be strongly disfavored”). 
 146. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. 
 147. See, e.g., Star Alliance Final Order, supra note 143, at 23 (rejecting the Interactive 
Travel Services Association and American Society of Travel Agents’ objection that granting 
alliance immunization would harm travel agents). 
 148. These academic critiques are, at best, incomplete and, at worst, haphazard.  This could 
be said of almost any attempt by academics to set and direct public policy.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. 
POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS: A STUDY OF DECLINE 166 (2001) (“[T]he public is sometimes 
misled by a public intellectual.”); THOMAS SOWELL, INTELLECTUALS AND SOCIETY 282–83 
(2009) (noting that public intellectuals may attempt to use “blatant examples of illogic” to support 
their claims). 
 149. See infra Part IV. 
 150. See, e.g. Reitzes & Moss, supra note 107, at 305 (noting that immunity grants can lead 
to “lower airfares . . . because alliance partners can coordinate pricing and share revenue” but 
“[t]his may eliminate competition among alliance members on the same gateway-to-gateway 
routes”). 
 151. Cf. Michael E. Levine, Airline Alliances and Systems Competition: Antitrust Policy 
Toward Airlines and the Department of Justice Guidelines, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 333, 335–39 (2008) 
(explaining that the main way to build networks is by developing a “fortress hub . . . designed to 
offer frequent, cost-effective service to travelers who value[] frequent and convenient service in 
markets too small to support service on a stand alone basis”). 
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those networks may remove competition on certain route segments, the 
benefits of the whole outweigh the losses to the parts.152 
Moreover, reductions in competition within a given alliance are allegedly 
offset by competition between alliances, even if they use distinct routing plans 
to move consumers from their starting point to their destination.  For instance, 
a passenger traveling from Grand Rapids, Michigan, to Frankfurt, Germany, 
may be routed by the Star Alliance from Grand Rapids to United’s hub at 
Chicago O’Hare.153  From there, the passenger would be placed on a Lufthansa 
flight bound out of Chicago for Frankfurt.154  SkyTeam—anchored by Delta 
Air Lines and Air France/KLM—may route the same passenger through 
Delta’s Detroit hub and onward to Frankfurt on a flight operated by KLM.155  
The passenger’s choice over which alliance to use will be informed by the 
usual array of preference factors, including cost, travel times, and perquisites.  
A passenger who regularly travels on United Airlines for U.S. domestic air 
service may opt to go with the Star Alliance because his or her entire 
journey—including the portion flown by Lufthansa—will contribute reward 
miles.156  Whether inter-alliance competition is sufficient to keep prices in 
check and service offerings high remains a matter of debate.157  The emergence 
of non-allied global carriers like Emirates, which uses its super-hub in Dubai 
as a swivel point from which to move passengers between Europe and points in 
Asia and Africa, may act as additional discipline on alliance fares and 
services.158   
According to some of the alliances’ and the DOT’s economic critics, this is 
all beside the point because the DOT fails to follow not only the economic 
tests implied in the statutory criteria for alliance approval and immunization 
                                                 
 152. Cf. id. at 335 (“Networks are very valuable to some time- and transaction-cost-sensitive 
customers who are willing to pay a lot to use them and . . . offer benefits through joint production 
and price discrimination to price-sensitive customers”). 
 153. See Bilotkach & Hüschelrath, supra note 87, at 77 (explaining code-sharing and noting 
that the current Star Alliance includes the United Airlines-Lufthansa partnership). 
 154. See id. 
 155. See id. (explaining how the SkyTeam alliance evolved from the Delta Airlines-Air 
France partnership). 
 156. See id. (noting that the “sharing of customer loyalty (i.e., frequent flyer) programs 
[among airline alliance members] is very common”). 
 157. See Reitzes & Moss, supra note 107, at 328 (2008) (concluding that “empirical analysis 
raises questions as to whether immunized alliances are continuing to deliver unequivocal benefits 
to consumers”). 
 158. Despite its strong competition position, Emirates has launched an extensive public 
campaign against the alliance system and antitrust immunity in the name of enhancing global 
airline competition.  See EMIRATES, AVIATION AT THE CROSSROADS: SAFEGUARDING 
CONSUMER CHOICE (2011), available at  http://www.emirates.com/zm/english/images/Aviation 
_at_the_crossroads_Aug11%5B1%5D-tem530-713620.pdf (stating, “[g]overnments should 
investigate and, if appropriate, intervene to stop alliance activities aimed at thwarting independent 
competitors”). 
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but also U.S. antitrust policy writ large.159  Hubert Horan bases his complaints 
on the fact that the statutory language for alliance approval echoes of language 
found in the Clayton Act, which leads him to assert that the DOJ/FTC Antitrust 
Guidelines for Collaborations Amongst Competitors and Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines provide the controlling tests that the DOT should apply when 
evaluating alliance applications.160  Horan conveniently ignores, however, that 
neither set of guidelines has the force of law.  Moreover, Horan fails to cite a 
single statute, regulation, or decision mandating the DOT to incorporate these 
documents into its immunization decisions.161 Horan—who is not an 
attorney162—largely repeats the DOJ’s arguments from their opposition to the 
Star Alliance’s immunity application.163  The DOT, however, is under no legal 
obligation to adhere to the DOJ’s opinions, no matter how cogently reasoned 
or well footnoted.164  At most, the DOJ’s comments, like Horan’s own 
regularly filed objections to antitrust immunity grants,165 provide food for 
                                                 
 159. Cf. Horan, supra note 24, at 252–53 (alleging that DOT immunity grants “were based on 
willful non-enforcement of the Clayton Act market power test and the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines’ requirement that applicants present verifiable, case-specific evidence of public 
benefits”); Reitzes & Moss, supra note 107, at 327–28 (questioning whether the DOT’s attempt 
to promote inter-alliance competition through its immunity grants has provided “sufficient 
competitive benefits”). 
 160. See Horan, supra note 24, at 254 (noting that the Antitrust Guidelines and Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines define the standards to be used in determining whether immunity can be 
granted). 
 161. See id. (failing to provide any law requiring the DOT to incorporate the Antitrust 
Guidelines in its decision-making). 
 162. Bio/Experience, HUBERT HORAN AVIATION, 
http://horanaviation.com/Bio_Experience.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2012). 
 163. See DOJ Comments on Star Alliance Show Cause Order, supra note 142, at 12–13 
(noting “an application for immunity must . . . make a ‘strong showing’ that, from the standpoint 
of public interest, the predicted value of antitrust immunity is greater than the proven value of the 
normal antitrust regime”).  The DOT expressly rejected this attempt in its final decision.  See Star 
Alliance Final Order, supra note 143, at 10 (holding that “[w]hile DOJ has suggested that less 
anticompetitive measures are available and that immunity does not benefit consumers, we are not 
persuaded to alter our fundamental initial assessment of the Joint Applicants’ request”). 
 164. See, e.g. Gillespie & Richard, supra note 20, at 1 (recognizing that the “DOT has the 
statutory authority to approve and immunize from U.S. antitrust laws agreements relating to 
international air transportation”). 
 165. See, e.g., Supplemental Comments of Hubert Horan, American Airlines, Docket No. 
DOT-OST-2008-0252, at 20 (Dep’t of Transp. Jan. 8, 2010) [hereinafter Horan oneworld 
Supplemental Comments] (opposing the oneworld Alliance on the grounds that it failed to carry 
its burden of proof in “requesting exemption from . . . antitrust laws”); Comments of Hubert 
Horan on the Department of Justice Public Comments of 26 June 2009, Air Canada, Docket No.  
OST-2008-0234 (Dep’t of Transp. Jul. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Horan Comments to DOJ’s Star 
Alliance Comments] (opposing the Star Alliance on the grounds that it provided insufficient 
evidence to substantiate a claim for immunity). 
2012] Institutional Defense of Airline Alliance Antitrust Immunity  161 
thought to DOT regulators.  Their analytical force, however, cannot 
compensate for their legal irrelevance.166 
Additionally, Horan, along with economists Volodymyr Bilotkach and Kai 
Hüschelrath, are vexed that DOT antitrust immunity decisions do not align 
with U.S. antitrust policy goals.167  But why should that matter?  Antitrust 
immunity, on its face, is a statutory exception to the contemporary legal ethos 
that “[t]he antitrust laws are intended to protect competition, not 
competitors.”168  It is difficult to imagine how immunity can ever interface 
with an antitrust policy that is supposed to be “vigorous”169 while “promot[ing] 
a narrow but well-defined goal—namely, long-run efficiency” upheld by 
“condemn[ing] conduct likely to result in diminished industrial output and 
increased market prices.”170  Short of eliminating the DOT’s authority to grant 
antitrust immunity for airline alliances altogether,171 even fresh limitations on 
DOT immunization powers would likely still provide some latitude for the 
DOT to place alliances beyond the reach of U.S. antitrust law.172  The DOT’s 
critics may welcome modest reform over no reform, but they fail to account for 
the cost of limiting the DOT’s larger international aviation policy goals.  The 
economic critics, who are hardly uniform in the force and depth of their 
objections,173 are institutionally walled-off from the “front line” air-services 
negotiations conducted jointly by the DOT and the DOS.174  The economic 
critics’ implied suggestion that abstract concepts of economic efficiency fueled 
                                                 
 166. See, e.g. Gillespie & Richard, supra note 20, at 1 (noting that Congress vested the DOT 
with statutory authority to grant antitrust immunity for airline alliances). 
 167. See Bilotkach & Hüschelrath, supra note 87, at 77–78, 81–82; Horan, supra note 24, at 
253–62 (criticizing, among other things, the DOT for “gutting, but not formally eliminating, the 
public benefit test of 49 U.S.C. § 41308(b), and the market power test of the Clayton Act” to 
streamline the approval process while only “maintain[ing] the superficial appearance of following 
the law”). 
 168. Levine v. Cent. Fla. Med. Affiliates, 72 F.3d 1538, 1551 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 169. See Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney Gen., Vigorously Enforcing the Antitrust 
Laws: Development at the Division, Remarks as Prepared for the Chamber of Commerce, 
Washington, D.C., at 3 (June 24, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/272536.pdf 
(recalling her pledge “to engage in vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws”). 
 170. Alan Devlin, Antitrust in an Era of Market Failure, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 557, 
565 (2010). 
 171. Eliminating the DOT’s authority to grant antitrust immunity is supported by some 
critics.  See, e.g., Horan, supra note 24, at 291 (suggesting that “Congress should consider 
shifting international antitrust authority to DOJ”). 
 172. Cf. 49 U.S.C. §§ 41308–41309 (2006) (affording significant discretion to the DOT to 
grant antitrust immunity). 
 173. Compare, e.g., DOJ Comments on the Star Alliance Show Cause Order, supra note 142, 
with Horan Comments to DOJ’s Star Alliance Comments, supra note 165, at 2 (criticizing the 
DOJ for “materially understat[ing] the problem” with respect to the DOT’s economic analysis). 
 174. See 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (2006). 
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by contentious theories175 ought to govern DOT decision-making appears to be 
a bridge too far. 
It is not that Horan, Bilotkach, and Hüschelrath, or the antitrust economists 
employed by the DOJ are furnishing bad analytics or that the DOT’s alliance 
rulings are paragons of good economics, but that the DOT’s custody of 
immunization powers should not depend on the economic integrity of its 
decisions.  Congress must take the unlikely step of placing explicit economic 
concepts and their attendant methodologies into the approval and immunity 
statutes before economic critiques of the DOT’s decisions become relevant.176  
Considering the absence of any clear political will for imposing such radical 
specificity into a congressional grant of customarily open-ended administrative 
power, the economic critics will have to remain content to air their grievances 
in academic publications and DOT administrative dockets.177  
B.  Lackluster Legality? 
Another line of attack against the DOT’s antitrust immunity decisions is the 
legalist critique.  As exemplified by Brian Havel’s review of the 
Northwest/KLM and American Airlines/British Airways (AA/BA) 
applications,178 the DOT’s rulings are subjected to legalistic review for 
compliance with the DOT’s underlying statutory authority.  Elements of policy 
come into play because the DOT is expected to balance its pro-liberalization 
international aviation goals with the general contours of U.S. competition 
policy.179  Whether that balancing act is indeed part of the DOT’s mission 
statement can be left to the side for the time being.  With respect to the DOT’s 
quasi-legal analysis of immunity applications, Havel chides the DOT for 
allowing Northwestern/KLM and AA/BA to “pass[] the immunization test” for 
“explicitly political reasons—in nomine open skies.”180  In the case of 
Northwestern/KLM, which rode the coattails of the 1992 U.S./Netherlands 
Open Skies agreement, the DOT, according to Havel, dispensed with the 
statutory requirements that it “assess[] either transportation needs or public 
benefits, as well as the unavailability of any materially less anticompetitive 
alternative to meet those needs or benefits[.]”181  In AA/BA, instead of 
                                                 
 175. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 976–77 (Elizabeth 
Boody Schumpeter ed., 1994). 
 176. See H.R. 831, 111th Cong. (2009) (providing an example of legislation that would have 
limited the DOT’s discretion by requiring a more in-depth economic analysis); see also supra 
note 29. 
 177. See, e.g. Horan oneworld Supplemental Comments, supra note 165, at 3; Horan, supra 
note 24, at 253. 
 178. See HAVEL, supra note 23, at 287–93. 
 179. See id. at 293–97; see also Hand, supra note 4, at 664–66 (providing an additional 
policy-heavy critique). 
 180. HAVEL, supra note 23, at 294. 
 181. Id. at 292. 
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allegedly dropping portions of the statutory test, the DOT conflated the 
statutory steps for approval and immunization, and imposed a “new [market] 
entry standard” on the application in order to induce the United Kingdom to 
create a de facto Open Skies agreement with the United States by opening up 
access to the heavily protected London Heathrow Airport.182  As to the 
question of whether the DOT’s legal chicanery was justified in its search for 
Open Skies, Havel’s attitude is decidedly cool.183 
Havel’s observations, from a strictly legalist perspective, are not without 
merit, though their import in the realm of DOT international aviation policy is 
questionable.184  Like the aforementioned economic critiques, the legalist 
approach is too conceptual to be useful.  Though Havel does not offer an 
explicit theory of antitrust immunity jurisprudence,185 his criticisms betray an 
academic/lawyer-held belief that the DOT or any administrative agency should 
be tightly constrained by its underlying statutes.186  The reality is that these 
statutes are often open-ended and subject to mixed judicial oversight of 
variable intensity.187  Alliance antitrust immunity, thus far, has not been 
subject to judicial review.188   
Perhaps Havel would prefer, like Horan and the DOJ, for immunity rulings 
to resemble mainstream U.S. antitrust analysis, with recourse not just to 
economists’ theoretical toolkits, but to the jurisprudence of federal courts as 
well.189  Or perhaps he wants a higher degree of consistency than exemplified 
by the Northwest/KLM and AA/BA decisions.190  Either way, it is unclear if 
                                                 
 182. See id. at 291–92. 
 183. See id. at 291–92, 301–02. 
 184. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 41309(b)(1)(A)–(B) (providing an exception allowing alliances 
and alliance negotiations that would reduce competition when necessary for “international comity 
and foreign policy considerations”); see also Dean & Shane, supra note 19, at 17–18 (noting that 
authority to approve and immunize agreements related to international aviation was preserved and 
transferred to the DOT from the CAB—a decision Congress made “predicated on a recognition 
that competition in international aviation is closely related to, and often a product of, the bilateral 
negotiation process,” making it essential that the antitrust exemption authority be “vested in the 
agency primarily responsible for the development of U.S. international aviation policy”). 
 185. See generally HAVEL, supra note 23 (noting in the introduction that a “recurrent theme” 
of the book is that air transport should look to “tangible commercial opportunities” rather than its 
“historical preoccupation with abstract legal categories”). 
 186. Cf. id. at 253–78 (surveying various arguments against deregulation and stating that 
deregulation failed to deliver lower prices and increase services for consumers); see also POSNER, 
supra note 82, at 16–19 (discussing the factors behind legalism in the United States). 
 187. See POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, supra note 26, at 84–112; POSNER 
& VERMEULE, TERROR, supra note 26, at 15–59 (examining judicial deference to the executive 
branch in times of emergency). 
 188. See infra Part IV.B. 
 189. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST 46 (2d ed. 2001) (describing the historical ebb 
and flow of antitrust cases filed in federal courts). 
 190. Compare Northwest/KLM Order to Show Cause, supra note 4, at 11–12, with Order to 
Show Cause, U.S.-U.K. Alliance Case, Docket No. OST-2001-11029, at 35 (Dep’t of Transp. Jan. 
25, 2002), 2002 DOT Av. LEXIS 27.  Though AA/BA initially failed to win antitrust immunity 
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deontological fidelity to a thick conception of the rule of law is warranted 
where the DOT must view the alliance applications through the lens of 
overarching international aviation policy goals.191  Moreover, it is unlikely that 
those States that have entered Open Skies-for-Immunity bargains will let the 
United States withdraw its half of the transaction on jurisprudential grounds.192  
Antitrust immunity is part of the package of payoffs that leaves signatory 
States believing they are better off ex post Open Skies than ex ante the 
agreement.193  The aspirational norms of legalist theory have no place in the 
pragmatist realm of aeropolitical relations.194 
IV.  AGAINST INSTITUTIONALLY INSENSITIVE REFORM 
The terms of the debate concerning antitrust immunity for alliances are 
primarily set by academic critiques, though interest groups195 and interagency 
conflict196 contributes to the antipathy against the DOT’s immunization powers 
and practices.  Missing from all of these criticisms is an appreciation for the 
DOT’s institutional capacities—capacities that have been aided and abetted by 
Congress’s generally laissez-faire approach to U.S. international aviation trade 
and the role of antitrust immunity in fulfilling the DOT’s pro-liberalization 
policy goals.197  Because the DOT, like other agencies, has distinct advantages 
over the legislative branch with respect to generating information and 
responding to changing circumstances in international civil aviation it is 
unsurprising that Congress has opted to defer to the DOT’s policy judgments 
                                                                                                                 
because of the United Kingdom’s unwillingness to enter into an Open Skies agreement with the 
United States and relax its historic entrance restrictions at London’s Heathrow Airport, the 
airlines were immunized in 2010 following the completion of a comprehensive Open Skies 
accord with all twenty-seven members of the European Union.  See oneworld Alliance Order, 
supra note 95; see also Harriet Oswalt Hill, Comment, Bermuda II: The British Revolution of 
1976, 44 J. AIR L. & COM. 111, 116–20 (1978) (discussing the historically stormy U.S./U.K. 
aeropolitical relations that prompted the closure of Heathrow to all but two U.S. airlines). 
 191. See 49 U.S.C. § 41309(b)(1)(A) (2006) (enumerating “international comity and foreign 
policy consideration” as an important public benefit that the DOT must consider). 
 192. See, e.g., Dep’t of State, U.S.-Colombia Memorandum of Consultations (Nov.  
8–11, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/151588.pdf (highlighting 
the importance that the Colombian delegation placed on antitrust immunity in the context of Open 
Skies agreements); John Hughes, Japan Requires Antitrust Immunity to Complete ‘Open Skies’ 
Deal, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news 
archive&sid=asAQYqyinmTg. 
 193. In international law circles, this pragmatic constraint is referred to as “International 
Paretianism.”  See ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE 6 (2010); 
see also Brian F. Havel & Gabriel S. Sanchez, Toward a Global Aviation Emissions Agreement, 
36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 351 (2012) (applying the International Paretian principle to 
international aviation law). 
 194. See Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5, at 15–16 (summarizing aviation’s longstanding 
zero-sum trade regime). 
 195. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text. 
 196. See Labaton, supra note 42, at A1. 
 197. See supra notes 54–58, 66 and accompanying text. 
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rather than attempt to micro-manage them.198  Despite this, the possibility of 
congressional intervention is never fully obviated, as evidenced by a  
short-lived 2009 proposal to curb alliance immunization.199  If, at some point 
in the future, Congress, with strong public support, revisits this issue, then it is 
critical that such deliberations not take place in splendid isolation from 
institutional realities.200 
There are a select number of possible reforms to the DOT’s antitrust 
immunity powers that flow logically from the two main lines of  
criticism—economic and legalistic—but, on the basis of the DOT’s 
institutional advantages, none of them are normatively attractive.  Although 
some reform may be politically appropriate in the future, it is unclear what 
those reforms would look like and whether trading institutional advantages for 
political capital is worth it.201 
A.  Amplified Congressional Oversight 
The first possible track of reform is for Congress to step in and scrutinize 
immunity applications with greater vigor.  This move may very well go  
hand-in-hand with increased congressional involvement in aviation trade 
policy generally.  Regardless to which setting Congress turns the oversight 
knob,202 it is unclear what effect further rounds of hearings and reports would 
have on DOT immunity decisions.  From an immunity critic’s perspective, the 
best scenario is that the congressional spotlight brings the requisite public 
attention necessary to furnish a mandate for more ambitious reform 
measures.203  But this suggestion puts the cart before the horse because it 
expects robust congressional action before a concentrated public cry for such 
                                                 
 198. See supra notes 58–60, 62–63 and accompanying text. 
 199. See supra note 29 (discussing Congressman Oberstar’s failed attempt to confine the 
DOT’s antitrust authority). 
 200. See Levine, supra note 44, at 272–74, 280 (providing reasons for why it is ineffecient 
for the airline industry to respond to the public interst: it is costly and time-consuming to 
formulate, the interests change over time, and “public interest” in general is “not verifiable, but 
only arguable”). 
 201. This Article offers no arguments that Congress should ignore popular support for 
revising, or even terminating, the DOT’s antitrust immunization authority on the basis of abstract 
principles (e.g., the “morality” of maintaining U.S. international commitments), or concrete 
realities (e.g., the economic cost of losing Open Skies partners).  These considerations seem 
academic in nature; freighting them with the sort of supervening efficacy that would place them 
over-and-above the will of the electorate may satisfy ivory tower gnostics, but always at the price 
of removing a significant check on governmental power.  Cf. POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE 
UNBOUND, supra note 26, at 113–53 (discussing political constraints on the President and 
agencies). 
 202. A scale that is unlikely to ever go to “11.” See THIS IS SPINAL TAP (Embassy Pictures 
1984). 
 203. See Dean & Shane, supra note 19, at 17 (describing a Senate hearing in which questions 
about whether the DOT was the appropriate agency to have the authority to grant antitrust 
immunity “approach[ed] outright hostility”). 
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action.  There is no guarantee that hearings or reports will dislodge the public’s 
general apathy toward aviation regulatory affairs, specifically alliance 
immunization.  Considering none of Congress’s past attempts to keep tabs on 
alliance immunization yielded any groundswell for reform,204 repeating the 
process is likely a waste of time and resources.  Further, Congress has not been 
shy about delegating broad trade policy powers to the executive branch, nor 
providing its imprimatur to far-reaching trade accords with nominal oversight 
and few legislative objections.205  In the aviation trade realm, Congress has had 
a de minimis role to play.206  Even if a greater degree of oversight is desirable 
on legalist grounds,207 its emergence in the aviation trade seems highly 
unlikely. 
Institutionally speaking, Congress is not well adapted to quick, decisive 
action—the sort that has proven necessary in the international aviation 
arena.208  For instance, the DOT hit the accelerator in 2010 on two 
consolidated immunization applications featuring Japanese airlines ANA and 
JAL in order to deliver an Open Skies agreement with Japan.209  Enhanced 
congressional oversight would have slowed the process and perhaps 
compromised the agreement with Japan.210  Moreover, U.S. aeropolitical 
relations should not be taken in isolation from other international policy 
concerns; the executive branch remains better situated than Congress to 
calculate the role of aviation trade in the matrix of U.S. foreign relations.211  To 
                                                 
 204. See supra note 68 (listing earlier, irregular attempts by Congress to review antitrust 
immunity). 
 205. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.  This does not mean, however, that these 
agreements did not raise the hackles of interest groups such as organized labor.  See James Shoch, 
Contesting Globalization: Organized Labor, NAFTA, and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fights, 
28 POL. & SOC’Y 119, 123–28 (2000). 
 206. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 207. See POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, supra note 26, at 7–10 (describing 
and critiquing legalist objections to strong executive authority including executive agencies). 
 208. Cf. Daniel Abebe & Eric A. Posner, The Flaws of Foreign Affairs Legalism, 51 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 507, 509–10 (2011) (explaining the judiciary’s historical deference to the executive 
branch on foreign affairs matters because, compared to Congress and the judiciary, which is 
“slow and decentralized,” the executive branch has “secrecy, speed[,] and decisiveness”). 
 209. See Horan, supra note 24, at 287–88 (criticizing the DOT for agreeing to take six 
months on alliance applications which, in the past, have taken up to 19 months to conclude); see 
also Final Order, U.S.-Japan Alliance Case, Docket No. DOT-OST-2010-0059 (Dep’t of Transp. 
Nov. 10, 2010), 2010 DOT Av. LEXIS 483.  The U.S./Japan Open Skies agreement entered into 
force three days after the close of ANA and JAL’s immunization proceedings.  See Air Transport 
Agreement, U.S.-Japan, Oct. 25, 2010, 2010 U.S.T. LEXIS 82 (entered into force Nov. 13, 2010). 
 210. See POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, supra note 26, at 8–10. 
 211. See Abebe & Posner, supra note 208, at 535–38.  Indeed, the EU has expressly stated 
that enhanced aviation trade relations are “a key factor in promoting productive co-operation 
between countries.”  See A Community Aviation Policy Towards Its Neighbours, at 2, para. 2, 
COM (2004) 74 final (Feb. 9, 2004). For an account of how aviation trade relations can be used 
as a building block toward an incremental climate-change treaty, see Havel & Sanchez, supra 
note 193. 
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urge Congress directly into the international field risks needlessly upsetting a 
foreign-relations governmental structure that, arguably, has no viable 
competitors.212 
B.  Expanded Judicial Review 
A second possible track that could meet the concerns of immunization critics 
is inaugurating federal judicial review of alliance application decisions.  Under 
this approach, the judiciary would require the DOT to align its economic 
review of antitrust applications with federal antitrust jurisprudence.  Another 
possibility would be for the judiciary to compel the DOT to be more mindful 
of the statutory language that grants its immunization powers.  Even though it 
is uncertain if a court would find fault with the present body of DOT decisions, 
it is unclear whether “hard look” review of immunization rulings is 
desirable.213  Compared to agencies, the judiciary’s tools for generating 
relevant information that bears on dynamic institutional determinations, such 
as furnishing antitrust immunity to fulfill international aviation trade policy 
goals, is lacking.214  Like the legislative branch, including federal courts in the 
process could draw a cloud of uncertainty over each application, which may 
curtail the DOT’s aviation trade policy agenda.215  Finally, considering 
Congress’s telling silence on the matter of swapping Open Skies-for-Immunity 
and that the legislative branch is at least better poised politically than the courts 
to monitor or curtail the DOT’s immunization powers,216 judicial intervention 
has scant qualities to recommend it for such a task.217 
C.  Interagency Power Sharing 
Another route that facially overcomes the institutional limitations of 
Congress and the courts would be to expand competence over alliance antitrust 
                                                 
 212. See, e.g., Abebe & Posner, supra note 208, at 528–33, 539–44 (providing a powerful 
criticisim of an alternative institutional model that would put the judiciary at the forefront of U.S. 
foreign affairs). 
 213. This is particularly true given the courts’ willingness to defer to agency decisions and 
apply weak review to the executive branch.  See POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, 
supra note 26, at 84–112; cf. POSNER & VERMEULE, TERROR, supra note 26, at 15–59 
(examining judicial deference to the executive branch in times of emergency).  Recall, “foreign 
policy considerations” can serve as a basis for green-lighting an alliance to the immunization step.  
See 49 U.S.C. § 41309 (2006) (governing the “approval” step in antitrust immunity 
determinations). 
 214. See POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, supra note 26, at 29 (“[T]he gap 
between the executive and the judiciary, in information and expertise, is even wider than between 
the executive and Congress.”); see also VERMEULE, UNCERTAINTY, supra note 26, at 111–12 
(describing the informational defects of courts); cf. id. at 214–15 (examining the costs and 
benefits of agency interpretation when compared to courts). 
 215. See supra notes 213–14 and accompanying text. 
 216. See U.S. CONST. arts. I, III (stating that the legislature is elected and federal judges are 
appointed). 
 217. See Abebe & Posner, supra note 208, at 529–33. 
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immunization to other agencies, such as the DOJ.218  The DOJ is already 
vested with some antitrust authority over airline mergers and other  
antitrust-related activities.219  As the main agency critic of DOT immunization 
decisions, there is no doubt that the DOJ possesses the institutional incentive to 
take custody of immunization proceedings and to apply its antitrust 
determinations to alliance applications.220  Additionally, because of the DOJ’s 
longstanding role in federal antitrust law and policy, it is better positioned 
institutionally to furnish appropriate antitrust review over alliance 
applications.221  This argument rests too heavily on the flawed assumption that 
standard federal antitrust analysis, with its economic elements,222 is an 
appropriate component of immunization proceedings or U.S. international 
aviation policy.  As discussed, international aviation operates within a web of 
bilateral agreements that impose restrictions on foreign investment.223  U.S. 
airlines in particular are restricted from accessing global capital markets and 
consummating cross-border mergers that would allow creation of autonomous 
global-route networks.224  If the international aviation industry was able to 
“do[] business like any other business,”225 then the DOJ would be authorized to 
review potential mergers to ensure their consistency with federal antitrust law.  
Considering the regulated nature of the international air-transport market, 
however, the DOJ’s “business-as-usual” antitrust review lacks weight.226 
Tied to this low view of DOJ institutional relevance in immunity 
proceedings is the stark reality  that the DOJ is not an instrument of U.S. 
international aviation policy like the DOT.227  Whatever virtues the DOJ 
                                                 
 218. Any number of other agencies could be proposed, but only one is considered here in 
order to ease the exposition.  More importantly, each new agency that is added would only serve 
to complicate immunization proceedings and inject uncertainty into the process.  Because 
uncertainty could harm U.S. aeropolitical relations, it should be avoided. 
 219. See J. Bruce McDonald, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Competition in the Air, 
Remarks to the IATA Legal Symposium 2007, Istanbul, Turkey (Feb. 12, 2007), transcript 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/222159.htm (“The DOJ Antitrust 
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 220. See Star Alliance Final Order, supra note 143 (acknowledging and addressing the DOJ’s 
comments against the proposed immunity). 
 221. See POSNER, supra note 189, at 43–44 (explaining the DOJ’s role in enforcing the 
Sherman Act). 
 222. See id. at 79–93. 
 223. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. 
 224. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (explaining the “Open Skies” agreements that 
the United States requires its airlines to use to create alliances). 
 225. See Havel & Sanchez, supra note 7, at 660.  This shibboleth has been used by the global 
air transport industry’s representative trade group, IATA, in its efforts to combat nationality 
restrictions on airline ownership.  Id. 
 226. See Star Alliance Final Order, supra note 143. 
 227. 49 U.S.C. §§ 41308–41309 (2006). 
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possesses in the antitrust realm are offset by its ignorance in international 
aviation affairs.228  Even where the DOT may lack relevant information 
necessary to conduct international trade negotiations, the DOS—by 
congressional grant—shares guardianship in the matter.229  What, possibly, can 
the DOJ add to the equation?  There is no evidence that the executive branch 
has contemplated including the DOJ directly in antitrust immunity and external 
aviation affairs.230 The Obama Administration’s behind-the-scenes resource 
deployment in 2009, which halted the political knife fighting that broke out 
between the DOJ and the DOT over antitrust immunity, can be seen as a 
victory for the DOT.231  In the end, the DOT was not compelled to acquiesce to 
DOJ demands to limit the scope of immunity that the DOT provided to the 
oneworld and Star alliances.232  Perhaps room could be made for adding 
international aviation trade to the DOJ’s responsibilities, but that is unlikely to 
come to fruition in a world where the DOT and the DOS have already 
exhibited their ability to perform external aviation functions competently.233 
D.  Statutory Limitations 
A final track to consider is the general possibility of Congress altering the 
underlying statutory authority for antitrust immunity in order to limit its scope 
or duration.  A proposal was advanced in 2009, but it fizzled  due to 
congressional inaction.234  The bill, if enacted, would have sunsetted antitrust 
immunity for any alliance three years after it was issued or renewed, but left 
open the possibility of a fresh grant of immunity following a new 
immunization proceeding.235  This approach ignores the reality that alliance 
integration agreements are complex, costly, and not easily unwound.236  The 
                                                 
 228. See, e.g., Horan Comments to DOJ’s Star Alliance Comments, supra note 165, at 2–3, 
7. 
 229. See 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (2006). 
 230. See, e.g., supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. 
 231. See Labaton, supra note 42, at A1. 
 232. See oneworld Alliance Order, supra note 95; see also Star Alliance Final Order, supra 
note 143. 
 233. Naturally, there is always room to quibble with certain aspects of DOT activity at the 
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 234. See supra note 29. 
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looming threat of immunization expiration would, in all likelihood, have a 
chilling effect on all but the most superficial joint ventures.237  Another 
problem is that a mandatory sunset provision could fray U.S. aviation trade ties 
and place U.S. Open Skies agreements in jeopardy.238  Further, the requirement 
that the DOT perpetually review immunization grants wastes departmental 
resources, particularly if there are no changes in the aeropolitical realm that 
warrant re-examining their terms.  If an Open Skies partner-State failed to 
abide by the terms of a treaty, the DOT could revoke an immunization grant to 
the offending State’s airlines.  But, absent international fall-out, the type of 
protracted review that commonly accompanies alliance applications appears 
unnecessary on policy grounds.239   
Regardless of what arbitrary term limit for antitrust immunity is proffered, in 
the end such legislative proposals only distract from the big-picture issue of 
why alliances are forged.  Although the United States has used the promise of 
alliances, secured through a grant of antitrust immunity, to entice States into 
Open Skies agreements, the alliances themselves would lose their central 
justification for existing if the airlines could replicate alliance benefits through 
global investment opportunities.240 
V.  MOVING BEYOND ANTITRUST IMMUNITY 
Under the current international aviation regime, airline alliances deliver the 
worldwide network benefits and consumer perquisites of authentically 
globalized airlines.241  Alliances’ commercial activities are facilitated by the 
liberalized operating environment created by Open Skies  
agreements—agreements that have helped sweep once-prominent aviation 
trade elements such as capacity limits, pricing controls, and route restrictions 
into the dustbin of economic history.242  But neither Open Skies nor any U.S. 
                                                 
 237. For example, a modification that would extend the sunset provision to ten years might 
be more palatable from the airlines’ and foreign governments’ perspectives, though given the fact 
that such an elongated stability period would do little to change the status quo, it is difficult to 
imagine congressional critics of antitrust immunity investing their time in enacting such loose 
terms. 
 238. The absence of guaranteed, longstanding immunization for their respective airlines 
might dissuade States from committing to such international legal agreements.  See supra notes 
194–95 and accompanying text. 
 239. “Commonly” does not mean “always.”  In the case of Japan, the DOT “fast tracked” its 
alliance review in order to secure an Open Skies agreement.  See supra note 210 and 
accompanying text.  Presumably, the DOT could “fast track” all alliance applications that come 
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DOT’s immunization decisions from further derision. 
 240. See Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5, at 11–15. 
 241. See Levine, supra note 151, at 335–38. 
 242. Compare BRIAN F. HAVEL, IN SEARCH OF OPEN SKIES: LAW AND POLICY FOR A NEW 
ERA IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 21–23 (1997), with HAVEL, supra note 23, at 13, 318–19 
(demonstrating a shift in legal/policy prescriptions from promoting Open Skies to looking toward 
the next generation of even more liberal aviation trade agreements). 
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free trade agreement has delivered reciprocal investment rights in airlines.243  
The United States may be constrained from repealing its own inward 
investment ceiling by the nationality restrictions found in most air-service 
agreements.244  This excuse loses force because the United States possesses 
one of the largest aviation markets in the world and has set the tempo for 
global aviation policy for over sixty years.245  A realignment of U.S. 
international aviation trade policy to liberal aviation agreements, which would 
swap antitrust immunity for investment rights, would send a strong signal to 
the international community that the days of immunized alliances are waning 
and that a novus ordo for global air services is on the horizon.246  Even though 
immunized alliances may be necessary in the interval between the advent of a 
new trade regime and the realization of a globalized aviation marketplace, 
alliances’ imminent extinction should be enough to quell the complaints of 
stakeholders and academics surveyed in this Article.247 
All of this is exponentially easier said than done.  That some of the DOT’s 
most vocal critics rabidly resist the idea of relaxing U.S. foreign investment 
restrictions in airlines is no small irony.  The same Congressman who proposed 
sunsetting alliance antitrust immunity in 2009 also championed several 
legislative initiatives to strengthen the U.S.’s citizen-purity test for airline 
ownership.248  Organized labor has also opposed foreign ownership, mainly on 
protectionist grounds.249  Further, issues of national security are implicated, 
though the United States has administrative measures in place to review and 
block unsavory investments.250  These factors, coupled with the public’s 
                                                 
 243. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1201(2)(b), Dec. 
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (excluding air services from coverage); see also, e.g., Free Trade 
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 249. See Havel & Sanchez, supra note 7, at 669 n.133. 
 250. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-320, FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT: LAWS AND POLICIES OF REGULATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN 10 COUNTRIES.  
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indifference toward aviation trade and regulatory issues, militate against the 
immediate possibility of substantial reform to U.S. investment rules in 
particular and the global air-services-trade regime as a whole.251  The DOT is 
capable of relaxing its review of foreign capital infusions in U.S. airlines,252 
but too brazen a defiance of a federal statute could incite a congressional 
versus executive battle that could do more harm than good.253  The DOT, at the 
very least, would be unable to deliver a firm commitment to U.S. aviation 
powers concerning investment rights until the legislative branch acts.254  
Meanwhile, the apparent need for the alliances and Open Skies-for-Immunity 
remains a fixed reality in U.S. international aviation trade policy. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Antitrust immunity undoubtedly rings strange to ears tuned to the triumphant 
hymn of deregulation that once resounded in Washington, think tanks,255 and 
academia,256 but it retains considerable purchase in the restricted confines of 
the international aviation market.  Revising, if not altogether eliminating, the 
DOT’s power to award antitrust immunity has been suggested by various 
camps, including industry stakeholders and academics, but their arguments 
have failed to take proper account of institutional variables thus far.257  
Specifically, they have erred in not fully appreciating the institutional 
advantages the DOT, as an executive agency, possesses with respect to 
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developing and executing international aviation trade policy.258  As such, their 
critiques place too much emphasis on the DOT meeting some higher-level 
concept of legality or economic efficiency and too little on the hard truth that 
the alternative frameworks flowing from their critiques are institutionally 
precarious and thus normatively unattractive.259  Perhaps, at some point down 
the road, more thoughtful reflection will be given to how immunization grants 
can be arranged to meet one or more higher-level concepts while still 
successfully maintaining U.S. policy agendas such as Open Skies.  Until then 
or, better yet, until the United States works to move aviation’s trade regime out 
of the dark ages, the DOT’s antitrust immunization authority should be left 
alone. 
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